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1. Introduction
The principle of pari passu, or equal treatment of the creditors in insolvency proceedings, is widely rec-
ognised in many countries. This is one of the key objectives for insolvency proceedings. The World Bank 
has found that ‘[t]hough country approaches vary, effective insolvency systems should aim to provide for 
equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors, including similarly situated foreign and domestic credi-
tors’.*1 This principle means that the creditors relevant to the insolvency proceedings should be treated 
equally in equal situations. Exceptions from the principle are as common as application of the principle 
itself, however. In most countries, a pledge-holder is preferred to other creditors with respect to the out-
come of sale of the object of the pledge. This means that the outcome of the sold object of the pledge is not 
distributed among all creditors but received by the pledge-holder for the pledged object. Some authors go 
even further and say that this does not constitute a true exception to the pari passu principle, because the 
pledged object should not be part of the insolvency estate and satisfaction of the secured creditors should be 
regulated outside the realm of insolvency proceedings.*2 Nevertheless, business and society depend on an 
adequate system of credit and it is, therefore, necessary to ensure the adequate protection of secured credi-
tors, to keep them lending. Consequently, the author considers it of utmost importance to avoid allowing 
other creditors to obtain dividends from the pledge sale before the secured creditor does.
The situation is more complex in the case of the fl oating charge, since it covers movable property of the 
debtor up to the amount of the charge. The author maintains that the fl oating charge is an easy, convenient, 
and fl exible way to secure a claim while both protecting the creditor’s interests and allowing the debtor to 
sell his property where necessary. On the other side, the fl oating charge covers almost all movable property 
of the debtor, which is sold in full to cover the claim. In such cases, the unsecured creditors end up left with 
nothing. Such a situation may amount to the unequal treatment of unsecured creditors. For this reason, the 
author concludes that, in contrast to regular secured creditors, less preferential treatment of the fl oating-
charge holders may be justifi ed. The author suggests creating a system for distributing a fair amount of 
money to the unsecured creditors on the account of the fl oating-charge holder’s fund. 
1 World Bank. Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems. 2001, p. 76. Available at http://
www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg_eng.pdf (most recently accessed on 23.3.2015). 
2 R.M. Goode. Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, second edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell 1997, p. 152.
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Therefore, the aim for this article is to analyse whether the claim secured by a fl oating charge should 
be preferred fully in insolvency proceedings. If full preferential treatment of the claim secured by a fl oating 
charge is not justifi ed, the question is this: to what extent should such claims be preferred?
Analysing the problem surrounding the priority limits of the fl oating charge in insolvency proceedings, 
the author presumes that the insolvency estate includes enough funds for the costs and expenses of the 
insolvency proceedings. The question of whether the secured creditor shall participate in covering the costs 
and expenses of the insolvency proceedings is another matter that is not covered by this article.
In addition to Estonian law, the author uses sources from English law, because the security instrument 
in question, the fl oating charge, has been widely analysed for a long time in the United Kingdom. Ger-
man law does not recognise an instrument comparable to the fl oating charge encountered in English law.*3 
Therefore, claims cannot be secured by a fl oating charge in Germany and claims so secured cannot have 
priority in insolvency proceedings. Obviously, if German law does not recognise the concept of the fl oating 
charge, there cannot be any special regulation pertaining to the fl oating charge in the Insolvency Statute of 
Germany.*4 The author will also analyse the laws of our neighbour states Finland and Latvia, because these 
states recognise the concept of the fl oating charge and our legal practice encompasses contact with these 
countries as our neighbours.
2. Justifi cation for the priority of the secured claim
Secured claims are those secured by various pledges such as mortgage, lien and registered pledge, fi xed 
charge, and fl oating charge. If the debtor fails to pay in time, the creditors are entitled to sell the pledged 
asset or have it be sold to cover the debt amount due. The pledge is highly important in the market economy, 
as it ensures satisfaction of a claim with a higher degree of probability. However, even having a secured 
claim does not relieve the creditor of all risks. For example, the market value of the pledge may be insuf-
fi cient to cover the claim. The property encumbered by the pledge may suffer damage. Yet the author sug-
gests that the pledge is the most reliable option for ensuring satisfaction of a claim.
All developed economies depend to a high degree on the availability of credit.*5 Many insolvency laws 
recognise the rights of secured creditors to have fi rst priority for satisfaction of their claims.*6 Therefore, 
secured claims shall be satisfi ed before regular unsecured claims, which constitutes an exception to the 
pari passu principle. The infringement of one principle may be justifi ed by other principles. According to 
another principle, security interests and other real rights created prior to the insolvency proceeding are 
unaffected by the winding up. This means that, in general, a creditor holding real rights, unaffected by the 
winding up, may proceed to realise his security or other right of property as if the company were not in 
liquidation.7*7
Pursuant to the English law in force, the liquidation of a company generally does not affect a creditor’s 
rights. The secured creditor is free to realise its security without reference to the liquidator.*8 This means 
that the English insolvency system differs from the Estonian insolvency system in that the object of the 
pledge is not to be part of the insolvency estate and the pledged object is to be sold outside the insolvency 
proceedings. This is the reason Prof. Goode fi nds that preferring secured claims is not a true exception to 
the pari passu principle.*9 
3 A. Rahmatian. A Comparison of German Moveable Property Law and English Personal Property Law. Available at http://
www.iuscomp.org/gla/literature/rahmatian.htm#sdfootnote0sym (most recently accessed on 21.3.2015).
4 Insolvency Statute of Germany. Available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_inso/index.html#gl_p0007 (most 
recently accessed on 21.3.2015).
5 World Bank. Report of Working Group on Debtor Creditor Rights. Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER-
NAL/TOPICS/LAWANDJUSTICE/GILD/0,,contentMDK:20154449~menuPK:146222~pagePK:64065425~piPK:162156~t
heSitePK:215006,00.html#1, material on debtor−creditor regimes (most recently accessed on 24.3.2015).
6 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, p. 269. Available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf (most recently accessed on 19.3.2015).
7 R.M. Goode. Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell 2011, p. 96. 
8 D. Faber et al. Commencement of Insolvency Proceedings. Oxford University Press 2012, p. 265.
9 R.M. Goode (see Note 2), p. 152. 
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According to §35 of the Estonian Bankruptcy Act,*10 the debtor’s assets become part of the bankruptcy 
estate upon the declaration of bankruptcy. This means that all assets of the debtor, including encumbered 
assets, become part of the bankruptcy estate. Section 135 stipulates that a trustee shall sell the bankruptcy 
estate pursuant to the procedure provided for in the Code of Enforcement Procedure, taking into account 
the specifi cations prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act. Pursuant to §153 (2), the outcome of sold encumbered 
property shall be distributed only to the charge-holder, with one exception – a certain percentage, but not 
more than 15%, shall be allocated to cover the costs and expenses of the insolvency proceedings. Therefore, 
under Estonian insolvency law, the pledged assets are part of the insolvency estate, which shall be sold 
by the trustee. The dividend from the sale of the encumbered property shall be distributed to the secured 
creditors. Although English law differs from Estonian law, the two systems have the same purpose. No 
other creditor than the charge-holder is entitled to receive the outcome of the sale of an encumbered item 
of property.
In the event of the pledged object being sold in the insolvency proceedings and the outcome being dis-
tributed in accordance with pari passu among all the creditors, the pledge-holder will not have any use of 
the pledge. This would cause uncertainty as to the securities in the insolvency proceedings, which would 
have a negative impact on the credit institution. The Cork Committee Report stated a conclusion that there 
is a direct link between every credit transaction and the fi nancial health of the society.*11 In consequence, 
the negative effect on the credit institution would harm the development of the market economy. The IMF 
has noted that, if a secured creditor is given the equivalent of fi rst priority at the time of distribution (or 
directly receives the proceeds from the sale of collateral), the provision of secured credit is facilitated.*12
Prof. Varul has summarised the problem as follows: ‘Secured claims shall be preferred to unsecured 
claims, because otherwise the pledge as such would lose credibility, which would have a bad infl uence on 
the development and stability of the economic relations.’*13 Therefore, limiting the pledge-holder’s rights 
would discredit the economic system. Accordingly, we cannot do it and must prefer secured creditors to 
unsecured creditors.
For the reasons described above, a claim secured by a fl oating charge is a secured claim and should be 
preferred over unsecured claims. On the other hand, the fl oating charge differs from other securities in that 
the object of the fl oating charge is more uncertain than the object of other securities. This position is sup-
ported in the literature, where Richard Calnan fi nds that ‘[a]lthough the basic principle is that a secured 
creditor is entitled to the net proceeds of sale of the secured assets in order to discharge his debt, where 
the charge constitutes a fl oating charge certain categories of unsecured creditor rank ahead of the fl oating 
charge’.*14 Therefore, a question arises as to whether the fl oating charge needs special treatment in insol-
vency proceedings.
3. The distinctness of the fl oating charge 
from other charges
Estonian insolvency law does not make any distinction between the fl oating charge and other charges with 
regard to the priority of the security in the insolvency proceedings. Secured claims, including the fl oating 
charge, have full priority under §153 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act of Estonia. The situation is the same in the 
Republic of Latvia. The fl oating-charge holder is a secured creditor under the Latvian Insolvency Law’s Sec-
tion 7, Subsection 1.*15 According to Sections 111 and 116, the administrator sells the pledged assets of the 
debtor and the holder of the fl oating charge has full priority in respect of the outcome of the realisation of 
the encumbered property.
10 Pankrotiseadus (Bankruptcy Act). – RT I 2003, 17, 95 (in Estonian).
11  Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce 1982, p. 12.
12 Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues. Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund 1999, p. 47.
13 P. Varul. Selgitavaid märkusi pankrotiseadusele (Explanatory commentary to the Bankruptcy Act). – Juridica 1994/1, p. 11 
(in Estonian).
14 R. Calnan. Proprietary Rights and Insolvency. Oxford University Press 2010, p. 37.
15 Insolvency Law of the Republic of Latvia. Available at http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/Likumi/
Insolvency_Law.doc (most recently accessed on 24.3.2015).
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According to §4 (3) of the Floating Charge Act*16 of Estonia, the fl oating charge will be created after the 
corresponding entry is made in the fl oating-charge register. Section 2 (1) stipulates that the fl oating charge 
extends to all movable property of a company or movable property related to the economic activity of a sole 
proprietor. Section 2 (2) amends the above-mentioned and specifi es that the fl oating charge extends to all 
encumbered property of an undertaking at the time the pledge entry is made and to the property acquired 
after the pledge entry is made. According to §2 (3), a fl oating charge does not extend to: 
1) money in cash form or deposited with a credit institution; shares, stocks, investment-fund shares, 
contributions to co-operatives or participation in other companies belonging to an undertaking; 
promissory notes or other loan documents accepted in common usage; or other securities;
2) property that may be encumbered by a fi xed charge, such as a possessory pledge or property that 
is encumbered by mortgage together with the immovable property with which it belongs to; or 
another type of pledge; or
3) property that, pursuant to the law, cannot be subject to execution.
Therefore, the fl oating charge covers almost all movable property of the debtor, with some minor excep-
tions. As the name ‘fl oating charge’ suggests and as described above, the object of the fl oating-charge assets 
fl uctuates. In contrast, the objects of other charges are specifi ed as certain properties or rights. The object 
of the fl oating charge shall fi nally be clarifi ed in the process of the realisation of the fl oating charge, which is 
termed ‘crystallisation’.*17 In England, for example, the fl oating charge crystallises if a receiver is appointed 
for the debtor’s company.*18 Therein, the fl oating charge differs from other charges because of their object. 
In that case, the question arises of whether we have to treat the fl oating charge and other charges equally 
or not. 
With respect to the difference, the fl oating charge encumbers all movable property of the debtor in its 
entirety, with the exception of certain minor assets. Consequently, the fl oating charge is regulated such that 
by covering the whole estate it causes other claims to be normally expected to remain fully unsatisfi ed.*19 
The resulting outcome is that in any insolvency proceedings wherein at least one fl oating-charge holder is 
present, unsecured creditors are not going to have the slightest motivation to participate and contribute to 
the insolvency proceedings. In fact, this means that one creditor is preferred to all other creditors in relation 
to the insolvent estate and causes unsecured creditors to be treated unfairly, thereby violating the principle 
of equal treatment of creditors.
The Cork Committee reached the conclusion that, to a limited extent, the general body of creditors 
should participate not like preferential creditors in priority to the holder of the fl oating charge but pari 
passu with him in the distribution of the proceeds from assets comprised in the charge. Such change may 
be expected to have the following benefi cial consequences:
(a) by increasing the amount available in winding-up proceedings for the ordinary unsecured credi-
tors, it should ensure a fairer distribution of the insolvent estate and encourage the ordinary credi-
tors to play a fuller part in administration of the winding up.
(b) By increasing the dividends payable in the course of winding up to ordinary unsecured creditors, 
including trade suppliers, it should reduce the risk of further insolvency among them and discour-
age their increasing tendency to resort to reservation-of-title clauses and other devices to escape the 
priority of the fl oating charge.*20
Consequently, the fl oating charge differs from other types of charges. The fl oating charge is fl uctuating in 
nature and covers almost all movable property of the debtor, with only a few, minor exceptions. In the case 
of any other charge, the unsecured creditors are aware of the assets that are secured, while the case of the 
fl oating charge involves the unsecured creditors being unaware of the extent. The unawareness on the part 
of the unsecured creditors causes injustice and discourages the unsecured creditors from participation in 
the insolvency proceedings.
16 Kommertspandiseadus (Floating Charge Act). – RT I 1996, 45, 848 (in Estonian).
17 P. Varul et al. Asjaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (The Law of Property Act II: Commented Edition). Kirjastus 
Juura 2014, p. 371.
18 J. Duns. Insolvency Law and Policy. Oxford University Press 2002, p. 349.
19 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (see Note 11), p. 32.
20 Ibid., p. 32.
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In consideration of the above, the author fi nds that claims secured by a fl oating charge should be prior-
ity claims in the insolvency proceedings as other secured claims are but, because of the difference between 
the fl oating charge and other securities, the priority of the fl oating charge should be limited. Therefore, the 
fl oating charge needs special regulation applying to insolvency proceedings.
4. Methods of limiting the priority of the fl oating charge
The literature offers several opportunities for resolution of the issue of how to limit the priority of the fl oat-
ing charge in insolvency proceedings. For instance, the Cork Committee suggested a novel alternative to the 
existing regulation of the fl oating charge. In summary, the committee named 10% of the encumbered estate 
as ‘a fund’. The idea of this fund is that a claim of a fl oating-charge holder is decreased by 10%, where the 
gain is distributed among the so-called regular creditors. The Cork Committee proposed that the deben-
ture-holder himself should not participate with the unsecured creditors in the 10% fund, but, to prevent the 
unsecured creditors doing better than the debenture-holder, the committee recommended that an upper 
limit be imposed so that the percentage of their debts received by the unsecured creditors should not in any 
event exceed that of the debenture-holder.*21 The system would function in the manner described below.
Let us imagine that the assets encumbered by a fl oating charge were sold at the price of EUR 1,000,000, 
the claim secured by the fl oating charge is EUR 1,000,000, and the claims of the unsecured creditors come 
to EUR 200,000. Under the current law, the claim secured by the fl oating charge will be satisfi ed in the 
amount of EUR 1,000,000, which equals 100% of its face value, and no monies will be paid out to the unse-
cured creditors. In contrast, in the case of the above-mentioned 10%-fund system, the claims secured via 
the fl oating charge would be satisfi ed in the amount of EUR 900,000, or 90% of their face value, while the 
amount of EUR 100,000 will be retained for distribution among the regular creditors. The claims of the lat-
ter will be satisfi ed in the amount of 50%.
I would discuss how the so-called upper limit in the case of the 10%-fund system would apply by giving 
the following example: Assets of the insolvent debtor have been sold for EUR 1,000,000, the claim secured 
by the fl oating charge is EUR 2,000,000, and the claims of the unsecured creditors total EUR 100,000. 
Under the current law, the claim secured by the fl oating charge will be satisfi ed in the amount of EUR 
1,000,000, which makes up 50% of their face value, and the unsecured creditors will not have any monies 
to share among themselves, which means 0% of their claims’ face value. In contrast, under the 10%-fund 
system without upper limit, the unsecured creditors’ claims will be satisfi ed in the amount of EUR 100,000, 
which comes to 100% of their face value, and the claim secured by the fl oating charge will be satisfi ed in 
the amount of EUR 900,000, or 45% of its face value. So without an upper-limit rule, unsecured creditors’ 
claims will be satisfi ed in their full amount and the fl oating-charge holder will receive only 45% of their 
claim’s face value. To avoid injustice here, the upper-limit rule applies, which means that the percent-
age of the unsecured claim being satisfi ed may not exceed the percentage of the secured claim satisfi ed. 
In that case, the claim of the fl oating-charge holder would be satisfi ed in the sum of EUR 952,381, which 
comes to 47.619% of the claim, and the claims of the regular creditors would be satisfi ed in the amount of 
EUR 47,619, which comes to the same 47.619% of the face value of the claim. 
The Cork Committee argued that such a system would ensure fair pay-out from the insolvent estate and 
could also encourage unsecured creditors to participate actively in governing the process of insolvency. In 
addition, it has been argued that increasing pay-outs to the unsecured creditors helps them to remain in 
business themselves and also decreases the unfairness caused by the current*22 fl oating-charge regulation 
under English law.*23 The propositions of the Cork Committee were taken into account for changes to the 
insolvency law of England. 
Beyond security claims, according to the insolvency law in effect in England, ‘the order of priority of 
distribution of the monies available for the realisation of the assets is as follows:
(1) the cost and expenses of the liquidation, including the liquidator’s own remuneration;
(2) preferential debts;
21 Ibid., p. 347.
22 Here, the committee report referred to the law that was valid at the time of the report’s composition.
23 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (see Note 11), p. 347.
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(3) (if there is a fl oating charge relating to property of the company) the prescribed part of the com-
pany’s net property, to be available for the satisfaction of ordinary, unsecured debts;
(4) debts secured by a fl oating charge (to be paid using the balance of the proceeds of realisation of the 
property comprised in the charge);
(5) ordinary, unsecured debts;
(6) post-insolvency interest on debts;
(7) deferred debts;
(8) the balance (if any), to be returned to the contributories.’*24 
Professor Fletcher explains that ‘the defi nition of the “prescribed part” is based on a hypothetical construct, 
which involves the computation of the amount of the company’s property (termed “the company’s net prop-
erty”) which would, but for the provisions of [the Insolvency Act 1986’s Section] 176A*25 itself, be available 
for satisfaction of the claims of holders of debentures secured by, or holders of, any fl oating charge created 
by the company’.*26 
Professor Fletcher continues: ‘First, where the company’s net property does not exceed £ 10 000 in 
value, the prescribed part consists of 50 per cent of that property. Secondly, where the company’s net prop-
erty exceeds £ 10 000 in value the prescribed part consists of the sum of two elements: 50 per cent of the 
fi rst £ 10 000 in value, and 20 per cent of that part of the company’s net property which exceeds £ 10 000 
in value. However, an absolute maximum of £ 600 000 is imposed on the total value of the prescribed part 
to be made available for the satisfaction of unsecured creditors in any given case.’*27
Professor Fletcher has found that ‘the purpose of this regulation is to adjust the distribution of corpo-
rate assets on insolvency, so that a portion of the assets comprised in any fl oating charge granted by the 
company is made available to the satisfaction of the unsecured creditors’.*28
In the author’s opinion, it is clear that these amendments made to the English Insolvency Act are com-
posed on the basis of methods quite similar to those outlined by the Cork Committee. The system of limiting 
the priority of the fl oating charge in the insolvency proceedings worked out by the Cork Committee and the 
system used in the Insolvency Act of England in force today are both based on rather excellent ideas, except 
that these systems are too complicated to implement.
For instance, Finnish law too appears to be affected by the ideas of the Cork Committee report, because 
the fl oating charge is not fully preferred in Finnish insolvency proceedings. However, the way that Finnish 
law regulates the priority of the fl oating charge in insolvency proceedings is much simpler. According to 
Article 5 of the legal act addressing priority claims*29, the claims of holders of a fl oating charge are secured 
only in the amount of 50% of the value of the encumbered assets.
5. The system of limitation of the priority 
of the fl oating charge
The author agrees with the Cork Committee to the extent that allocation of a certain amount from the funds 
originally meant to be distributed to the fl oating-charge holder, on behalf of the unsecured creditors, will 
relieve injustice and motivate unsecured creditors to take part of the insolvency proceedings. However, the 
author is of the opinion that the 10% fund proposed by the Cork Committee is too complicated in imple-
mentation. That said, the methods proposed in the report are necessary for composition of a fair system for 
determining the amount to be distributed to the unsecured creditors on behalf of the fl oating-charge holder.
Considering the discussion above, the author supports creation of a system for distributing a fair 
amount of money to the unsecured creditors on behalf of the fl oating-charge holder’s fund. Although the 
24 I.F. Fletcher. The Law of Insolvency. London: Sweet & Maxwell 2009, p. 773.
25 Insolvency Act 1986. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents (most recently accessed on 
21.3.2015).
26 I.F. Fletcher (see Note 24), p. 787.
27 Ibid., p. 788.
28 Ibid., p. 787.
29 Laki velkojien maksunsaantijärjestyksestä (Act on the Ranking of Claims). Available at http://www.fi nlex.fi /fi /laki/ajan-
tasa/1992/19921578 (most recently accessed on 21.3.2015) (in Finnish).
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fl oating-charge holder is a secured creditor, this intervention in the rights of the fl oating-charge holder is 
justifi ed – if its extent remains minimal – because of the principle that security interests and other real 
rights created prior to the insolvency proceedings are unaffected by the winding up. Therefore, the system 
for distributing a fair amount of money to the unsecured creditors on behalf of the fl oating-charge holder’s 
fund should be as simple as possible and limit the rights of the fl oating-charge holder only to the minimal 
limit necessary on the one hand, and to relieve injustice and encourage the unsecured creditors to partici-
pate in the insolvency proceedings on the other hand.
In consideration of the above, the author proposes the following solution. The claims secured by the 
fl oating charge would be preferred to a certain extent only, and in the remaining part such claims should 
participate in the distribution to the unsecured creditors in accordance with the pari passu principle. This 
solution guarantees that in a certain amount the fl oating-charge holder will be preferred and in the remain-
ing amount the claim that was secured by the fl oating charge shall not go unsatisfi ed but participate in the 
distribution of the remaining funds on equal ground with the unsecured creditors, according to the pari 
passu principle. This system enables regulation of the extent of the priority accorded the fl oating-charge 
holder by percentage and secures a particular fund for the unsecured creditors. In any case, if there are 
funds to be distributed, the fl oating-charge holder will receive more than unsecured creditors and un secured 
creditors will not remain fully unsatisfi ed. The determination of the exact percentage indicating the extent 
to which the fl oating-charge holder should be preferred is up to every jurisdiction. The author would recom-
mend limiting the priority of the claim secured by the fl oating charge to 50%.
For example, if the claims secured by the fl oating charge were to be preferred in the extent of 50%, the 
situation would be as follows. Let us take a case wherein the assets of the insolvent debtor have been sold for 
EUR 1,000,000, the amount of the claims secured by the fl oating charge is EUR 1,000,000, and the claims 
of the regular creditors amount to EUR 300,000. Current Estonian law provides for the satisfaction of the 
claim of the fl oating-charge holder in its entirety and the regular creditors have nothing to receive. 
In contrast, under the system the author proposes, the claims secured by the fl oating charge are pre-
ferred in the amount of EUR 500,000, or 50%. Next, the remaining EUR 500,000 is to be shared pari 
passu among the regular creditors and the fl oating-charge holder to the extent that his claim remained 
unsatisfi ed. In consequence, the second-rank claim of the fl oating-charge holder is satisfi ed in the amount 
of EUR 312,500 (that is, 62.5% of EUR 500,000) and the so-called regular creditors receive EUR 187,500, 
which is 37.5% of EUR 500,000. In summary, the fl oating-charge holder receives EUR 500,000 plus 
EUR 312,500, which totals 81.25% of the claims. The regular creditors’ claims are satisfi ed in the amount of 
EUR 187,500, or 62.5% of their face value. Such an outcome is much more acceptable to the regular credi-
tors and, at the same time, does not decrease the fl oating-charge holder’s dividend signifi cantly.
Proceeding from the foregoing, the author maintains that the claims secured by the fl oating charge 
should be preferred to a certain extent only. In the remaining part, such claims should participate in the 
distribution to the unsecured creditors in line with the pari passu principle. Taking into consideration the 
Finnish law, the author fi nds that it is reasonable to prefer the fl oating charge only in the amount of 50% of 
the outcome. In the remaining part, such claims must be treated with unsecured claims in accordance with 
the pari passu principle. 
6. Conclusions
The author has reasoned in this article that secured creditors should have priority in insolvency proceed-
ings. If the security were to be void in the event of insolvency, the risk of unsuccessful investments in the 
case of insolvency becomes higher for the creditor. The greater risk of losing the invested amounts leads to 
higher interest rates and a reduction in loans. Accordingly, creditors will invest more funds if their loans 
are secured in case of the insolvency of the debtor than if their loans are not secured in case of the debtor’s 
insolvency. Securing the claim induces creditors to invest more funds, which encourages the credit sys-
tem. The credit system is important for the development of the market economy. Thus, the protection of 
securities in the insolvency proceedings develops the economy, which is the reason for which the security-
associated claims shall be preferred in insolvency proceedings. 
The fl oating charge is a security and, accordingly, shall be preferred in insolvency proceedings. Still, 
the fl oating charge differs from other securities – because of its object. If a loan is secured by a pledge, the 
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lender and the borrower know that, whatever happens, the object of the loan shall secure the loan. This 
means that if the borrower does not pay, the object of the pledge shall be sold and the outcome shall cover 
the loan. In regular cases, the creditor and the debtor know exactly what object is pledged. Only in the case 
of the fl oating charge shall the object of the pledge become known after crystallisation. This means that 
the object of the fl oating charge is not certain; as the name indicates, the object is fl oating. Generally, the 
object of the fl oating charge includes all of the movable property that is not secured by other pledges, with 
some exceptions (money, stocks, etc.). In the case of the fl oating charge having full priority in insolvency 
proceedings, the outcome of the process of selling the property of the insolvent debtor shall be distributed 
only to the fl oating-charge holder whilst the claims of the unsecured creditors remain unsatisfi ed. A situ-
ation wherein the claims of the unsecured creditors go unsatisfi ed distinctly decreases the interests of the 
unsecured creditors in participating in the insolvency proceedings and infl icts inequality. Full priority of 
the fl oating charge in the insolvency proceedings so as to leave the unsecured creditors without dividends is 
strictly against the principle of collective proceedings and the principle of the equal treatment of creditors 
in the course of insolvency proceedings. 
Whereas the nature of the fl oating charge differs from that of other securities, special regulation of 
the fl oating charge is necessary for insolvency proceedings. In order to relieve injustice and motivate the 
un secured creditors to take part in the insolvency proceedings, one should limit the full priority of the fl oat-
ing charge in the insolvency proceedings such that a certain amount from the funds generated via the sale 
of the property secured by the fl oating charge shall be distributed to the unsecured creditors. 
The author suggests a system wherein the fl oating charge would be preferred to a certain extent only 
and in the remaining part such claims should participate in the distribution to the unsecured creditors in 
accordance with the pari passu principle. 
The exact percentage is a matter for further discussion. The author considers it reasonable that 50% 
of the amount of the claim secured by the fl oating charge be regarded as a secured claim. The remaining 
amount can participate in distribution of dividends equally with the unsecured creditors’ claims in line with 
the pari passu principle. 
This system does not infringe the rights of the fl oating-charge holder signifi cantly, yet it relieves injus-
tice and increases the degree of participation of unsecured creditors in insolvency proceedings.
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